The United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released a long-awaited report evaluating the intelligence that had been presented to Congress and the public leading up to the Iraq War. The report highlighted a range of failures within the intelligence community, particularly regarding the presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in Iraq. It found that claims about Iraq's stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and its nuclear capabilities lacked adequate evidence and were presented in a manner that overstated the actual dangers posed by Saddam Hussein's regime.

Prepared as a reaction to growing criticism of the pre-war intelligence assessments, the report revealed how intelligence agencies had failed to effectively share information and analyze data, resulting in a lack of consensus about Iraq's capabilities. The document was significant not only for its specific findings but also for the broader implications it had for public trust in government and military action.

The Senate report was released amidst ongoing military operations in Iraq and amid rising casualties among U.S. forces and Iraqi civilians. As the public began to question the justifications for war, the findings deepened divisions within both political parties and contributed to a broader discourse on accountability in government. As people sought answers to the crisis that continued to unfold, the report served as a central piece of evidence in the argument that the war was based on unreliable intelligence and misrepresentation.